Mark Amos Blog

More Musings about Kant and Theology

2012-01-01T06:35:00.000-08:00

To further think through Kant’s impact on theology I have workedthrough some of Colin Gunton’s posthumously published lectures on Revelation and Reason. Gunton recognisesthe huge impact that Kant has on theology. ‘Whatever you do as a theologianafter Kant is done in the man’s shadow’, he says. Theology, post Kant, is forced to become more self-conscious with regard to its methodology. Predominantly,Kant is attacking any form of metaphysical optimism and because of this attacktheology cannot anymore be uncritically metaphysical. As we know from Kant, theform of reason he permits is moral reason. The place for religion, in Kant’sassessment says Gunton, is at most to help decipher what is morally right; forthe Christian this can take the form of following a set of moral precepts asset out in scripture. Gunton notes, however, that Kant leaves no room for anacceptance of that all-important Christian doctrine; that of the incarnation. Thatis to say, a theology which attempts to build on the notion that God can beknown through the revelation of Christ is not rational. It may, at most, bepossible to affirm God’s existence as a moral agent but to talk about that Godbecoming flesh amongst us does not conform to any kind of legitimate reason.

Gunton then uses a framework set out by Barth in his Protestant Theology in the 19^thCentury to address where theology can go after Kant. The first way ofprogressing is in the manner of Albrecht Ritschl. Ritschl aimed to hold on to abasically Kantian framework. He tried to establish a Christological version ofKantianism which held Christ as the good moral teacher par excellence. Thesecond way forward is a revision of the Kantian methodology as seen inFriedrich Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher, notes Gunton, uses a similarframework to Kant but wants to say that one can say more about existence thanjust ethical and physical statements. Schleiermacher held these two forms ofknowing together by making our experience of the world and of God about anabsolute dependency. In being dependent upon nature for what we are and beingdependent upon God as our ethical law giver we have a truly authenticexperience of religion and the world. Christian theology can talk about this byemphasising the Christological in the sense that we are dependent upon Christboth for our ethic and for our experience of the transcendent God. The problemwith this according to Barth is that you make your knowledge of God utterlydependent upon experience rather than being reliant on God’s self-disclosure.Thus Schleiermacher is really not saying much more than Kant about thepotential of knowing. Gunton makes the interesting suggestion thatSchleiermacher ends up with something like an experiential version of Aquinas’five ways in that you proceed from your experience of the world to acomprehension of God. For Schleiermacher this is more about feeling thanreason, but nevertheless there is a similar starting with experience. Guntonnotes, though, that Schleiermacher’s emphasis on feeling left him open to thecriticism of Feurebach whereby religion is just the ‘realized wish of theheart.’ Ultimately, Schleiermacher proceeds no further than an anthropologicalaccount of religion.

The final option for the theologian working in a postKantian climate is that advanced by Hegel. Hegel was heavily critical ofSchleiermacher’s withdrawal to feeling. What Hegel is interested in is truth.It is not that Hegel has not remembered Kant’s critique of reason; but he ismuch more positive about truth. He talks about the synthesis of our knowing andthe world in which we inhabit. Truth, for Hegel, is something that happens as amovement through history. Gunton notes Barth’s optimism at this point for Hegelin this positive speech about truth. However, where the two are at odds is thatin responding to Kant, Hegel has to make talk about truth rational. The way hedoes this is by subjecting all truth to a method of philosophy which isessentially pantheistic. God, in other words, can be spoken of as truth becauseultimately God is an event in human history. In the incarnation, for example,and Hegel almost sounds orthodox here, God is happening in Jesus Christ. He istherefore, within the reach of human reason. So Hegel helps in bringing truthback on the agenda, but he only goes so far. The question becomes, is there amodern theology that at once addresses Kant’s critiques whilst being moreoptimistic about the object of theology. The next thing I need to do isconsider whether either Barth or Rahner manage to do this.

Christmas books

2011-12-27T08:06:00.000-08:00

I've had four great books for Christmas: Tolstoy's War and Peace, a series of John Webster's sermons entitled Grace and Truth, A book on Martin Luther's theology in its context and Marilynne Robinson's Home. As ever, i've started more than one of them already even thought i'm still reading other books! It might be that one day i'll finish one of them! I have also eaten too much

Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

2011-12-23T06:37:00.000-08:00

Having completed myMaster’s thesis I received some feedback about how I could have emphasised moreKarl Rahner’s reliance on Immanuel Kant. I am well aware of this influence andcould just about explain it if pushed. However, I feel that I do need a greatergrasp of not only Kant’s philosophical method, but also how it applies tomodern theology and modern theologians. This seems like a large task, but overthis Christmas break I thought I might at least aim to make a start on it. Partof the reason for not having done this in much depth previously is because Ifind Kant so frustrating; but I do recognise that he is of upmost importance. Thisfirst post is simply an overview of the introduction to Kant’s epoch making Critique of Pure Reason.

In the firstsentence of the original preface to Kant’s critique of pure reason he statesthat “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to considerquestions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature,but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind”. It isno wonder that Kant has had such an impact on intellectual thinking for thepast few centuries. He gets so quickly to the heart of the problem of knowingthat he simply can’t be ignored. The reason why reason cannot ascend to suchheights as these transcendental questions demand is because it can never movebeyond experience; that is, it can only work with what is present a posteriori. This brings us to thequestion of metaphysics and whether or not this science remains a usefulendeavour. For Kant there can simply be no means of a pure entry to suchabstract or transcendental questions as that which metaphysics aims to dealwith. Under critique, metaphysics struggles to survive; and in this strugglethose who want to defend a genuine metaphysical knowing often withdraw, saysKant, into dogmatism. Further than this, as the critique implies, those whowould say that reason in some way guards against dogmatism, are just as like tomake metaphysical claims. Kant is quite clear that religion comes under thesame criticisms that any other metaphysical enquiry might. And if religion isto remain a worthy pursuit it cannot be seen as exempt on the basis that it isbased not on reason but on faith.

The way that Kantproceeds is not first and foremost to critique the concept of metaphysics assuch; rather, he pitches his critique at the idea of reason – pure reason –itself. Within this critique Kant still wants to maintain that there is genuinepotential for human knowing a priori butthis dimension has to be absolutely established cognitively to be able to speakof it with any certainty. So in the introduction to the critique Kantrecognises that all knowledge begins with experience. Here Kant acknowledgeshis obvious reliance on David Hume. This does not close one off from talkingabout the possibility of that which exists apriori. But one cannot talk about that which is a priori by reference to experience. Kant says that a priori knowledge can only arise fromfollowing rules that are universally real. To meet the demands of genuine a priori knowledge a judgement has tonot be open to any possible exception. Even strict empiricism, Kant says, isnot capable of absolute universality. Mathematics is an example of whereuniversal rules might apply. That every change has a cause is a universalisablefact. Even here, though, one must admit that one’s entry into mathematicalknowing is through empirical means; however, our cognitive faculties, it mustbe said, are capable of knowing that which is a priori. So Kant does not deny that there is such a thing as themetaphysical. In fact there does indeed exist that which is beyond experience.His aim is to understand the ground of where these metaphysical cognitionsmight arise. Plato, for example, recongnised that such a discovery was worthmaking the effort to pursue. Kant recognises, then, that a priori knowing can potentially take place and should therefore beattempted, but he also recognises that not all knowing that we may giveourselves to truly exists a priori.

Kant then lays outtwo categories of statement: Synthetic and Analytic. “Analytical judgements(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate withthe subject is cogitated through identity; those in which this connection is cogitatedwithout identity, are called synthetical judgements.” Synthetic judgements are those that are moredifficult to establish a priori inthat they contain a conception that does not relate cognitively to an initialstatement. Synthetic propositions are those that tend to be those that relateto experience. Why these propositions are so difficult to establish as a priori is that the experience thatthey relate to is not possible to establish cognitively. Nevertheless, it issynthetic propositions which are so important to establish a priori. Mathematics is an example of synthetic knowing. One mightsay that it is rational and that mathematical propositions are cognitive.However, mathematical statements are those that are fundamental propositions inthemselves; in other words, they are taken to be a priori. A simple sum, for example, requires two numbers to beadded to each other. This is more than analytic because the numbers themselvesdo not contain the final conclusion of the sum. Likewise to mathematics,physics is a science reliant on synthetic judgements. Metaphysics is certainlya synthetic discipline and metaphysical propositions are never made a posteriori. They are, therefore, of ahighly difficult nature and therefore metaphysical enquiry is so difficult toestablish and so has to admit to only being an attempted, though important,enquiry.

Hopefully I willget around to dialoguing further with Kant and exploring his relation to moderntheology…

Man and Woman

2011-10-24T07:37:00.000-07:00

In Volume III.1 of Church Dogmatics Karl Barth discusses the creation accounts in Genesis. Having not read much first hand on his view of women, it was interesting to see what he had to say about the creation of woman from Adam’s rib. It is fairly clear that Barth is a subordinationist in terms of his views on women. That issue aside, (wherever one stands!) he says some fascinating stuff that it would be a shame for those who reject his ultimate views to pass over.

He considers four aspects worthy of note: The first is that woman is part of man. She is not just another human being but ‘a being which he can and must recognise as part of himself.’ The second thing is that man cannot produce woman by himself. He does not control the process of her coming into existence. She comes from his rib but this is an act of God which takes place when man is asleep. And I think that part of the point here is that she is not something, unlike with the other creatures, which he has dominion over. Thirdly, that in the creation of woman from man, man loses something of himself. In this loss man is still wholly himself in the sense of survival. He is, though, in another sense, incomplete without woman. Finally, woman, too, is a complete human in the important sense of her existence as autonomous to man, but, for Barth, the creation of man is not fully complete without the creation of woman. The climax of creation, therefore, results in the being of both man and woman as that which is constituted by their fellowship. It is important, then, that Barth is acknowledging the difference and interdependence of man and woman. It may be that this in no way deals with the difficult question about male and female roles, but I do think it provides a helpful criticism of a certain modern view that treats male and female as though they are entirely autonomous and also entirely not worthy of distinction.

Things to do

2011-08-11T00:22:00.000-07:00

I have finally submitted my Masters thesis so thought I would think of some things to do with my time (Completely selfish things that are for my own benefit only!). Each is given a probability of completion out of 10

1. Read War and Peace (8)
2. Learn German properly (4)
3. Finish reading Church Dogmatics (6)
4. Sell some things on ebay (6)
5. Get fit (0)

Piper's 'Desiring God' part 1

2011-08-08T06:40:00.000-07:00

The introduction for the new edition of Piper's Desiring God attempts to provide an apologia for writing a book on 'Christian Hedonism'. Piper acknowledges that reformed theology has always allowed for enjoyment in the Christian life but suggests that it has never seen it intimately linked to a theology of worship. He claims that the chief end of man should be to 'glorify God by enjoying Him forever' rather than 'to glorify God and enjoy Him forever' as the Westminster Catechism would have it. Worship includes, in other words, the enjoyment of God. Piper includes reference to C.S.Lewis to support his case who basically said something like ‘Hope for enjoyment is a good thing. We don’t have to follow Kant in having a glum outlook.’ (My paraphrase) Now, I pretty much agree with Piper here, though with reservations.

The major difficulty I have, though, which I hope Piper picks up on later, is that when he uses the word 'God', he seems to do so with little explanation. What I mean by this is that 'God' is not explained in terms of his revelation in Christ or in terms of his being as Trinity. Piper presumes we know what he means by the word. He is clearly wanting to say it is the God of the Bible that desires to be worshipped and enjoyed, but what people mean by the God of the bible can vary so much. This could well be explained later on, but at this stage it makes me nervous.

John Piper

2011-08-01T04:15:00.000-07:00

For a long while now, I have been aware of the need to read some John Piper. He is such a reformed evangelical mainstay and seems to be influential for so many people; not least of all within the Newfrontiers group of Churches of which I am part. The problem is, I have been worried that when I read him I am going to end up being critical and this doesn't help anyone. I read bits of him before studying theology, and found what I read to be very helpful at the time. His emphasis on the majesty and sovereignty of God and likewise on the grace of God are emphases that I would always want to affirm. However, having read first of all people like N.T Wright on the biblical studies side and then Karl Barth on the systematic theology side (not easy bedfellows I know, but both very formative for my thinking), I came to realise that there would probably be a lot that I would find in Piper that would not quite sit rightly with me.

Part of this skepticism, though, I have to admit, comes from soundbites I have heard from him that don't help his cause in my eyes (soundbites can make any theologian sound like an heretic!). For example, I heard a talk of his whereby he suggested that God has a greater love for the elect. I also find that he doesn't help the penal substitution debate along in the sense that he uses language of the atonement that seems so violent and extreme in terms of the Father's action toward the son (It should be noted that I agree, in basic terms, with certain descriptions of penal substitution). Finally, from what I have picked up (and again I haven't read enough to be watertight here), he seems to really misunderstand the issues in his squabbling with Wright on Justification (though I am not wholly behind Wright on this).

So, I need to read him properly. I am going to start with his classic Desiring God and see how I go. Hopefully more posts will follow!

Religious Education Matters

2011-06-02T06:47:00.000-07:00

Mixed blessings in the world of RE

1. I took 4 A-level pupils to a brilliant conference with Rowan Williams, Keith Ward and John Perry as speakers. The pupils were seriously engaged and the speakers all spent time discussing with the pupils afterwards. (http://mcdonaldcentre.org.uk/2011/05/24/rowan-williams-john-perry-speaking/) The disappointing thing was that so few turned up from other schools, which is worrying in terms of RE teachers not taking up these kinds of opportunities

2. It's great to see how many people are getting involved in the campaign to get RE included in the EBacc. Over 100000 signatures and over 100 mp's signing the early day motion. Good RE is great and should definitely be included. The problem is, is the quality of RE as good as it should be? If RE wants to be taken seriously as a GCSE, the GCSE should do more than just discuss a few moral issues (I know that many courses do, but not enough)

Theology and Biblical Studies

2011-05-02T07:22:00.000-07:00

I am reading an excellent book at the moment entitled The Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham and Jesus by Walter Moberly.

Moberly wants to say that scripture should be seen as a true resource for theology whilst also acknowledging that biblical studies must be done properly in its own right. In the first chapter he talks about the difficulties faced by the biblical scholar who tries to use scripture as a resource for theology. This may not seem a big issue to those who read scripture everyday and just presume that they can construct a theology based upon this. But because of the place of biblical studies in the university and in the modern context in general many simply don’t allow that this process can be objectively undertaken. This subject is fascinating for me as I often find it particularly frustrating that biblical studies and systematic theology are seen as separate disciplines.

Moberly identifies several reasons why the two disciplines have become increasingly separate. (I recognise at this point that I might have merged some of my thoughts in with his!) Firstly, the priority of reason in the enlightenment led toward the tendency to critique scripture on the basis that reason could find the truth behind scripture. This truth looked very different to what the biblical authors and early theological thinkers considered to be truth in terms of the Christian gospel. What followed were the various forms of modern biblical criticism; most of which did not allow the biblical message to speak for itself. Secondly, Moberly recognises the problem of the fact that scripture reading is done in the Church. To be part of the Church tends to involve an affirmation of certain creedal statements regarding the person of Christ and the Trinity. Therefore, the committed Christian is supposedly incapable of an objective interpretation of scripture as he or she already presumes that such a doctrine will be found in scripture. The final issue is that a reading of the bible inevitably results in the general issue of speech about God. Because of the emphasis on rationality and the charge that the Christian engaged in biblical studies is inevitably too subjective; God speech becomes a real problem. Can one, for example, say that the bible says x about God and therefore x is true about God. The problem is intensified by the fact that speech about God is so different to other speech. Moberly says, though, that if someone is to truly engage with the biblical texts then he or she must ultimately attempt to address the truth claim for which they are making.

At this stage Moberly is just outlining some of the issues; obviously he is going to provide some possible solutions in the coming chapters. I hope his ability to deal with the solutions is as good as his ability to raise the issues!

Moltmann on the Charismatic movement

2011-04-24T14:01:00.000-07:00

I came across these Jurgen Moltmann quotes on the Charismatic Movement in Anthony Thiselton's The Hermeneutics of Doctrine. It's great to hear what someone so theologically aware as Moltmann has to say - at once so affirmative and so challenging:

Moltmann describes the Spirit as 'the charismatic vitality of the new life.'
He suggests that 'every Christian is a charismatic, even if many people never live out their gifts.'
He warns that healings of the sick cannot be 'contrived' but 'happen when and where God wills it. There is no method for healings of the this kind.'

Barth's Christology part 1: The freedom of God

2011-04-13T06:49:00.000-07:00

I've been researching Barth's Christology for a while now. I'm finding Barth as compelling as ever and there is so much in his Christology that is valuable. Here's a very brief summary of one of the points that's been occupying me regarding God's freedom:

Barth definitely sees the freedom of God as of huge importance. This is Paul Molnar's point in Divine freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity. I think, though, that freedom isn't understood by Barth in the normal way - specifically in the sense of an immutable metaphysical God who is aloof from creation. This means that Barth allows Christology to set the grounds for what freedom is. So, for example, Barth would say that Christ's history is God's history, or that the electing God is the elect man. This is not freedom in the sense of freedom from others (on this I am partly taking my cues from Bruce McCormack). What I think can be said is that God's freedom is his freedom for us. This is how God exercises his freedom - in giving of himself to humanity fully in Christ. So Barth: God 'in all His omnipotence and holiness and eternity, is gracious and merciful and long suffering, who is this not as the One who is self-existent, self-reposing and self-motivated, but in His movement to man.' (Church Dogmatics 4.1. 126)

Theology Matters

2011-02-26T12:40:00.000-08:00

It's really exciting to see this new website devoted to theology from Newfrontiers http://theology.newfrontiersuk.org/. Looks good so far and it will be great to see how it continues to develop.

Auschwitz visit

2011-02-22T03:21:00.000-08:00

Having just returned from a visit to Krakov and Auschwitz I thought I would try to record some of my thoughts:

The first thing that struck me was the normality of life for those people living around the Auschwitz camp - people were living very near by and were just getting on with their lives. The suffering that took place within the walls of the camp is well documented, but should a place move back into normality after time? I guess it has to.

What else struck me was that the way in which the camp developed seemed to be very unspecific. How does one go from firstly thinking that a race is inferior to then making that race work in horrific conditions to finally deciding upon utter liquidation? How the human mind can go through this horrible process is disturbing.

Finally, the immense scale of the Birkenau camp made a big impact with me as I am sure it has done with so many before. How do we assimilate this into our consciousness without coming up with overly simple solutions; particular in terms of adopting a solve all Theodicy? The closest that I can come to is something like the following quote from Jurgen Moltmann in The Crucified God: 'God in Auschwitz and Auschwitz in the crucified God - that is the basis for real hope that both embraces and overcomes the world'

Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita

2010-12-31T02:59:00.000-08:00

Just finished reading this book over the Christmas break. The book works on all sorts of levels. It truly is mind blowing and a brilliant exposition of the problem of evil. The presentation of Pilate as being used in Christ's salvific purposes seems to make good sense of the Roman context whilst interweaving a type of seemingly Irenaean theodicy. It's also brutally subversive in terms of a critique of a developing Communist state gone bad - no wonder it was initially heavily censored. Highly recommended

Which Theologian Quiz

2010-04-13T13:06:00.000-07:00

I tried this quiz a few years ago. It tries to identify which theologian you are most sympathetic with. People have been critical of it, but the author admits that it's just a bit of fun. I think it might be right on my top 4 - not so sure about the rest!

http://quizfarm.com/quizzes/new/svensvensven/which-theologian-are-you/#

You Scored as Karl Barth
The daddy of 20th Century theology. You perceive liberal theology to be a disaster and so you insist that the revelation of Christ, not human experience, should be the starting point for all theology.
Karl Barth 93%
John Calvin 80%
Jürgen Moltmann 60%
Anselm 53%
Friedrich Schleiermacher 40%
Martin Luther 40%
Augustine 33%
Jonathan Edwards 33%
Charles Finney 27%
Paul Tillich 13%

Some thoughts on the Christology of Karl Rahner

2010-04-10T04:14:00.000-07:00

After quite a lot of reading on Rahner's Christology, some threads are beginning to come together.

This post will deal in very brief terms with some of the criticisms laid at Rahner's feet.

Rahner has often been criticised for starting with anthropology. To someone who has found Karl Barth so helpful this sounds worrying, but to write Rahner off at this point is equally unhelpful. Anthropology, for Rahner, is based on the fact that God reveals himself, specifically in the incarnation of the word. That Rahner can talk about humans as being capable of hearing God's revelation is based precisely on this premise. Rahner may still not emphasise the distinctiveness of God's revelation sufficiently but it is fair to say that in starting methodologically with anthropology there is the prior reality of the incarnation in mind.

Another aspect that has been criticised with regards to his Christology is that he does not emphasise the particularities of Christ enough. It is true that he does not speak of particularity as regularly as one might hope. This does not, however, mean that particularity plays no part. Indeed, Rahner can say that Chalcedon, for example, does not speak of particularity sufficiently and that there should therefore be a responsibility laid on the shoulders of modern theologians to deal with aspects such as Christ's messianic identity more fully.